Imelda argues that the circuit court erred in: (1) amending the judgment to substitute Imelda as the personal representative of the Marcos Estate and entering judgment against her in that capacity; (2) denying Imeldas motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, argued on the grounds that (a) the Roxas Estates claims against the Marcos Estate were barred by (i) the statute of limitations, (ii) the act of state doctrine, (iii) the head of state doctrine, and (iv) lack of personal jurisdiction, and (b) there was insufficient evidence to support the Roxas Estates claims for (i) conversion, (ii) false imprisonment, and (iii) damages; (3) failing to give preclusive effect to the opinion of a Philippines trial court regarding the authenticity of the golden buddha; and (4) admitting hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators exception of Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 803(a)(2)(C) (1993). HRE Rule 803 provides in relevant part that [t]he following [is] not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: A statement that was offered against a party and was uttered by a co-conspirator of the party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Imeldas points of error (2)(a)(i), (2)(a)(ii), (2)(a)(iii), (2)(a)(iv), (2)(b)(i), (2)(b)(ii), (3), and (4) are without merit.
[Download message RAW] --==============(77462805484968871=Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Log: dic with frequency info!
The defendant-appellant/cross-appellee Imelda Marcos (Imelda), in her alleged capacity as personal representative of the Estate (the Marcos Estate) of former Philippine President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (Ferdinand), appeals from that portion of the amended judgment of the first circuit court entered in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants the Estate of Rogelio (aka Roger) Domingo Roxas (the Roxas Estate) and the Golden Budha Corporation (GBC) (collectively, the plaintiffs-appellees) and against the Marcos Estate.
The plaintiffs-appellees cross-appeal from: (1) that portion of the amended judgment (a) entered in favor of Imelda, in her individual capacity, and against the plaintiffs-appellees and (b) ordering the Marcos Estate to pay damages for conversion in the amount of $22,001,405,000.00; (2) the circuit courts order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs-appellees motion for an award of prejudgment interest; and (3) the circuit courts order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs-appellees motion to alter the judgment.
In their cross-appeal, the plaintiffs-appellees argue that the circuit court erred in: (1) ruling, as a matter of law, that conversion of property is a condition precedent to the imposition of a constructive trust and the commission of a fraudulent conveyance with respect to the property; (2) instructing the jury that the proper measure of damages for the conversion of the gold bars and the golden buddha was the value of the bars at the time of conversion rather than the highest value of the gold between the time of the conversion and the time of trial; and (3) failing to award prejudgment interest to the Roxas Estate and awarding inadequate prejudgment interest to GBC.
With regard to the plaintiffs-appellees first point of error, we agree that conversion is not, pursuant to Philippine law, a condition precedent to liability based on a theory of constructive trust and that the circuit court erred in so ruling.
Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the amended judgment entered in Imeldas favor on GBCs claim based on constructive trust and remand for further proceedings before the circuit court sitting in equity.
On the other hand, we hold that the circuit court correctly ruled that the jurys verdict in this case precluded a finding of liability against Imelda for fraudulent conveyances.
With regard to the plaintiffs-appellees second point of error, we hold that the circuit court erred in its instructions regarding the value to be assigned to the converted property, although we adopt a rule different than that advocated by the plaintiffs-appellees.